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                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                      FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                         
 
                     Nos. 95-3404 and 96-3250 
                                         
 
                          DAYHOFF INC., 
                   a California corporation; 
 
                                       Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
           H.J. HEINZ CO., a Pennsylvania corporation; 
           HEINZ ITALIA S.p.A., an Italian corporation; 
            HEINZ DOLCIARIA S.p.A., formerly known as 
             SPERLARI S.p.A., an Italian corporation; 
             SPERLARI s.r.l., an Italian corporation; 
                  and HERSHEY FOODS CORPORATION, 
                    a Delaware corporation. 
                                 
                                        
                                 
        On Appeal from the United States District Court 
            for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
               (D.C. Civil Action No. 93-cv-01794) 
                                         
 
                    SUR PETITION FOR REHEARING 
                      BEFORE ORIGINAL PANEL 
                   ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION 
                                         
 
       BEFORE:  GREENBERG, ALITO, and MCKEE, Circuit Judges 
                                       
         The petition for rehearing filed by the appellees, H.J. 
Heinz Co., Heinz Italia S.p.A., Heinz Dolciaria S.p.A., Sperlari, 
s.r.l. and Hershey Foods Corporation, in the above captioned 
matter having been submitted to the judges who participated in 
the decision of this court and the panel having determined to 
grant the petition but only to the extent of amending the panel 
opinion. 
         It is hereby ordered that the slip opinion in the above 
case filed June 24, 1996, be amended to the end that the 
incomplete paragraph at the bottom of the page shall end eight 
lines from the bottom at the end of the sentence concluding "may 
be distinguished from that before us."  At that point two 
paragraphs reading as follows shall be inserted: 
              Further, this case presents a different 
         issue than those we addressed in Barrowclough 
         v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 752 F.2d 923 
         (3d  Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds 
         by Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
         & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993), 
         and Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
         & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir. 1993).  
         In Barrowclough, we upheld the enforcement of 
         an arbitration clause in an action between a 
         fired employee and his former employer, 
         applying the agreement not only to the 
         plaintiff's claims against his employer, but 
         also to his claims against additional, non- 
         signatory defendants.  However, in 
         Barrowclough, the plaintiff had signed an 
         agreement with the New York and American 
         Stock Exchanges that required him to submit 
         all disputes "arising out of [his] employment 
         or the termination of [his] employment" to 
         arbitration.  Id. at 937.  The non-signatory 
         defendants, who were directly tied to the 
         plaintiff's former employer, did not object 
         to arbitration.  Id. at 938.  Moreover, the 
         contingent beneficiaries under the 
         plaintiff's deferred compensation plan, who 
         joined in the suit as plaintiffs, claimed no 
         present entitlement to the deferred 
         compensation and pressed no claims separate 
         from his.  Id.  Thus, we held that their 
         "inchoate and derivative claims should not 
         entitle them to maintain separate litigation 
         in a forum that has been waived by the 
         principal beneficiary."  Id. at 938-39.  
         Barrowclough thus presented a vastly 
         different factual scenario from the case 
         before us. 
 
              Likewise, our holding in Pritzker does 
         not alter our decision here.  In that case, 
         we reaffirmed the idea that "[b]ecause a 
         principal is bound under the terms of a valid 
         arbitration clause, its agents, employees, 
         and representatives are also covered under 
         the terms of such agreements."  7 F.3d at 
         1121.  We also held there that an arbitration 
         agreement between pension plan trustees and a 
         securities broker applied to the broker's 
         sister corporation that acted as the broker's 
         advisor and that allegedly participated 
         knowingly in breaches of fiduciary duties 
         owed to the plan.  Even though the sister 
         corporation had not signed the arbitration 
         agreements, we applied agency logic in 
         finding that the sister corporation's 
         interests were directly related to, if not 
         predicated upon, the broker's conduct and 
         that the trustee's claims against it were 
         therefore subject to compulsory arbitration.  
         Clearly, this agency theory is not applicable 
         to the facts before us.  
 
         Following the insertion of the foregoing two paragraphs 
the incomplete paragraph shall resume with the words "We also 
point out" but these words shall be the beginning of a new 
complete paragraph. 
 
                                BY THE COURT: 
 
                                /s/ Morton I. Greenberg 
                                 
                                                                  
                                         Circuit Judge 
 
DATED:   July 24, 1996 
